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ABSTRACT: 
Cultural theory utilizes concepts drawn from social anthropology, sociology, and organization theory to explain 
the social and cultural biases of policy actors and interest groups. Certain ideas of nature are associated with each 
cultural bias; these ideas of nature are in turn associated with types of resource management institutions. By 
identifying an actor or group's culture bias, analysts can explain the success or failure of different management 
activities. This paper explains the evolution of cultural theory from its anthropological roots to its applications in 
ecological management. It then applies cultural theory to a typology of common property resources and illustrates 
its usefulness by examining grazing subsidies in the American southwest. 
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ARTICLE: 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper has two objectives. The first is to demonstrate the relevance of cultural theory to environmental 
management. The second is to show, through a preliminary discussion of grazing subsidies in the American 
southwest, how cultural theory may inform political decision makers, aiding them in achieving permanent and 
politically legitimated policy changes. This particular case shows how a "tragedy of the commons," rather than 
dragging to its presumably inevitable conclusion, may be changed to a more sustainable management approach. 
 
CULTURAL THEORY 
Although "cultural theory" as an aspect of cultural anthropology has existed for some time, the genesis of a 
theory of political cultures can be traced to the work of Mary Douglas (1982). She uses the two dimensions of 
group and grid to describe four types of social environment (Fig. 1). Group is defined by "the claims it makes 
over its constituent members, the boundary it draws around them, the rights it confers on them to use its name 
and other protections, and the levies and constraints it applies" (Douglas, 1982, p. 191), while grid describes the 
number and intensity of rules. Strong grid imposes, for example, rules on gender roles and status, while an 
example of weak grid is a free market where only the rule of contract remains valid. The operative level Douglas 
uses is "that at which excuses are required for individuals and made by them and where moral judgments 
materialize into pressures from other persons to act in certain ways . . . . [The] relevant level of analysis is that at 
which people find it necessary to explain to each other why they behave as they do" (Douglas, 1982, p. 201). 
Thus, her analysis is conducted at the level of the individual as a social being. As will be shown, Thompson 
(1984, 1985) relies as well on an individual level of analysis, but Wildaysky (1987) does not. 
 
In a number of works, Aaron Wildaysky has developed Mary Douglas' individually based cultural theory to 
include political actors. Rather than viewing the concerted actions of individuals as defining a cultural context, he 
considers the result of their activities as the culture, and uses this to predict other behaviors of the same group. In 
this way, he advances the theory from primarily one of description to one that allows prediction. 
 
Wildaysky defines political cultures as "shared values legitimating different patterns of social practices" (1987, p. 
5). These values cannot be separated from social relations, and the two together generate political preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
The shared values indicate preferred ways of life, and the cultural preferences help individuals and groups to 
choose policy alternatives. What distinguishes this approach from the common economic or political science 
orientations is that the source of the preferences is internal; they "emerge from social interaction in defending or 
opposing different ways of life" (1987, P. 5). 
 
Wildaysky follows Douglas' four categories derived from grid-group dimensions. He has, however, changed the 
labels, and to some extent the characterizations of the categories (Fig. 2). 
 
The individualists seek open competition. They support social differences and avoid hierarchical categories of 
class or economic status. The market is used to achieve maximum individual gain. It is these highly competitive 
entrepreneurs who, others insist, risk the "tragedy of the commons" in their use of resources because they have 
such low affinities for group norms or for cooperative regulation. 
 
The hierarchs favor institutionalized authority. They believe that organized inequality, which perpetuates social 
and economic class systems, is helpful in establishing division of labor and role specialization, both of which 
enhance social harmony and stability. Hierarchs are inclined toward technical fixes for resource problems, and 
they seek regularized control of the system in which they operate. 
 
Egalitarians, who have strong groups but few prescriptions, share a "life of voluntary consent without coercion or 
inequality" (Wildaysky, 1987, p. 6). They prefer to reduce differences among people, and they tend to be small 
groups and short-lived (for an example of an egalitarian group, see Davis, 1985). Because egalitarians are 
inherently suspicious of the external "system," they resist external controls; because they value equality, they will 
impede a peer's progress rather than see him get ahead of the remainder of the group. 
 
The fourth group, the fatalists, are not of great interest in setting policies. They are apathetic and under the 
virtually complete control of outside forces. Thus, there is "no point in their having preferences on public policy 
because what they prefer would not, in an event, matter" (Wildaysky, 1987, p. 7). 
 
CULTURAL THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Michael Thompson (1984), using the work of C. S. Holling and others, has integrated work from ecological 
sciences into the cultural theory approach. In cultural theory, there are no resources that are inherently common 
property. Everything can be privatized or, conversely, communalized (Thompson, personal communication). The 
resource management scientists must explain why, when faced with similar natural situations, management 
institutions vary in their intervention strategies. The ecologist copes with this variability by deducing varying 
myths of nature which are "the minimal representations of reality that have to be ascribed to the various 
management institutions if these institutions are to be granted the dignity of rationality" (Thompson, 1984, p. 20). 
If one can correlate myths of nature (identified with types of management institution) with ideas of nature 
(identified with cultural biases), then one may begin to correlate management institutions with cultural biases. 
Management institutions which are congruent with the cultural biases of the resource users are most likely to be 
effective and accepted. 
 
Holling (1978) has described four views of nature: nature benign, nature ephemeral, nature perverse/tolerant, and 
nature resilent. Nature benign views natural resources as existing only through the action of ingenuity and skills 
on raw materials. The magnitude of the resources available has little to do with their supply, which largely 
derives from human skills; hence, any use of resources will have no effect on global stability. Nature ephemeral 
sees the natural world as limited and fragile; resource users who hold this view prefer "fine-scales, local 
autonomy" (1978, p. 100) in resource allocation and management. Nature perverse/tolerant sees the natural 
world as forgiving (tolerant) of resource depletion but only to a limit. Once that limit is exceeded, the natural 
world falls apart (perverse). Finally, nature resilient can absorb and utilize change, achieving a balance despite 
almost any user abuse. 
 
Thompson (1984) has incorporated these myths of nature into the Douglas/Wildaysky approach to cultural 
theory. He notes that culture is dynamic and is subject to negotiation (adaptive behavior) and change (adoptive 
behavior). One of the factors that brings about cultural change is nature, which forces individuals to test their 
views of rational behavior against the real world. Surprise occurs when the accumulated weight of evidence in 
disagreement with a cultural view breaks through the cultural filter, thereby contradicting existing ideas. When 
the natural world regularly demonstrates an anomaly, the prevalent view of nature must be modified, which may 
in turn lead to a modification in positioning on the grid-group model. For example, the nature benign model 
would lead one to expect watercourses and land masses to absorb infinite amounts of nontoxic waste. When the 
waters become so polluted that fish can no longer survive and recreational swimmers must be prohibited, it is 
necessary to consider an explanatory model of the natural world which allows for some degree of regulation of 
the resource users, a situation not expected in the nature benign model. 
 
Using the grid-group model, Thompson generates a model of five social contexts, each of which is associated 
with an "idea of nature." These often parallel the myths of nature developed by Holling but differ in their 
theoretical origins. The ideas of nature "have been deduced from the different kinds of moral justifications 
needed to stabilize different patterns of social relations [but] the myths of nature are arrived at entirely by 
ecological argument" (Thompson, 1984, p. 19). 
 
Thompson's five social contexts represent five distinct social beings: the hermit, the entrepreneur, the ineffectual, 
the hierarchist, and the egalitarian. These contexts are associated with only three kinds of organization, each of 
which has a separate idea of nature. The first organization type is the ego-focused network in which lie all the 
individualist (weak group) social biases. These three biases (hermit, entrepreneur, and ineffectual) see nature as a 
cornucopia. For the ineffectual, access to the cornucopia is beyond his control; it is a lottery where skill has no 
impact. The enterpreneur, in contrast, believes that with skill and a little luck, he can gain access to the resources. 
His tragedy is the "tragedy of the commons." The hermit, who has managed to be free of social constraints, is 
also free to draw upon the cornucopian resources as needed (Thompson, 1984, pp. 6-9) 
 
The second kind of organization, the bounded egalitarian group, sees nature as both subject to depletion and 
accountable. This is because the egalitarians have two great moral justifications: absolute equality of result within 
the group (unlike the individualist who seeks equality of opportunity) and system (outside the group) blame for 
abuse of nature. If nature were inexhaustible, there would be no need for equality of result since one person's gain 
would not automatically imply another's loss. Because the egalitarians believe they are properly using natural 
resources, the depletion can only be explained by asserting that nongroup members, i.e., the system, is at fault 
(Thompson, 1984, p. 10). The tragedy of this system, unlike the tragedy of the commons that characterizes the 
cornucopian model, is crabs in a barrel: 
 
In the West Indies fishermen will put their day's catch of live crabs into a barrel. Though crabs are good 
climbers, the fishermen do not bother to put a lid on top of the barrel because no sooner does one crab 
climb up toward the rim than it is immediately pulled back down by its fellows. All the crabs could 
escape if only they were prepared to allow some to go first. But they are not, and they all perish (Thomp-
son, 1984, p. 10). 
 
Finally, the hierarchists are found in the hierarchically nested group. They cannot subscribe to a cornucopian 
model; if nature were limitless, there would be no need for a structured, discriminating organization. Hierarchists 
do not want equality of result or equality of opportunity. In the egalitarian-bonded group, everyone finishes 
equal; in an ego-focused network, they begin equal. The equality stressed in a hierarchy is equality before the 
law: "a hierarchical law that embodies the premise of inequality and entitles those of high rank to be tried by their 
peers. Peer review, the established method of assessment in the scientific community, provides a nice example of 
this moral principle at work" (Thompson, 1984, p. 10). The hierarch's solution is an isomorphic nature. Nature, in 
this view, mirrors the complexity, order, and predictability of society. The hierarch's tragedy is the triumph of 
technique over purpose: when the maintenance of ritualized class and status overcomes reasonable utilization of 
resources (Thompson, 1984, pp. 10-11). 
 
Relying on both Holling (1978) and Holling, Walters, and Ludwig (1981), Thompson maps the myths of nature 
into the ideas of nature (Fig. 3). 
 
Nature Ephemeral requires self-sacrificing human behavior and requires effective group sanctions; it fits very 
neatly with the bounded egalitarian view of Accountable Nature. Nature Benign fits the ego-focused individulist 
view that encourages bold experimentation; it maps easily onto the skill-controlled cornucopia idea of nature. 
Nature Perverse/Tolerant "encourages the pursuit of certainty and predictability" (Thompson, 1984, p. 21). This 
mapping, however, is incomplete; lottery-controlled (ineffectual) and freely available cornucopia (hermit) ideas 
are not accounted for.
2 
 
Thompson adds two myths of nature: Nature Capricious and Nature Truly Benign. Nature Capricious fits the 
lottery-controlled cornucopia view of the ineffectual. However, the entrepreneur does not truly believe in Nature 
Benign: it is only the "public face of the entrepreneurial cultural bias" (Thompson, 1984, p. 21). It is the hermit 
who owns the myth of Nature Benign; the entrepreneur really sees Nature Red in Tooth and Claw behind the 
benign facade. 
 
 
 
CULTURAL THEORY AND COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
Common property resources are a special case of natural resources that often generate peculiar management 
problems. They are limited resources which may be renewable or nonrenewable, and they have a pool of users 
whose access may be restricted, i.e., governed by prescriptions or rules, or not restricted. Usually, the problems of 
managing common property resources arise when enforcement of the rules or prescriptions is hindered, when the 
size of the legitimate user pool exceeds the capacity of the resource, or when the demands made by the users 
exceed the capacity of the resource. It is important to note that by definition, common property resources are not 
the same as open-access resources which have unrestricted entry by the users (Buck, 1988). 
 
A typology of common property resources was developed in an earlier work (Buck, 1989).
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 In its simplest form, 
this typology is based upon three factors: the nature of the resource itself, the property right involved, and the 
scale of the user pool. Both the property right dimension and the scale of user pool are clarified when cultural 
theory is applied. 
 
Property rights are either transferable or not. Transferable or individual rights are saleable for goods or money, or 
are subject to bestowal and removal for services rendered. Nontransferable rights have been removed from 
individual control and rest with the government or with the community of users. These rights may be assigned to 
individuals but the individual may not transfer the right to another. For example, in medieval villages, a 
householder could not sell his right to use common pasture and still retain his house and property. The house 
could be transferred, thus inevitably transferring the right to common but the right to common was not severable 
(Gonner, 1966, pp. 3-4). 
 
Similarly, property rights may be exclusive or nonexclusive. Exclusive rights imply a limited access to the 
resources; grazing permits for public land are exclusive in that only a limited number are issued, and access to 
public grazing is restricted to those holding permits. A non-exclusive right gives access to the resource to a 
defined pool of users rather than to individuals; anyone may use the municipal parks. In discussing these rights, 
the cultural biases of the managers must be taken into account. For example, grazing permits for public 
rangelands were originally issued by managers who perceived the range as virtually limitless, and the exclusive 
rights were granted on a rather free-wheeling basis. As the range managers became more professionalized and 
therefore more hierarchical, their views on the quantity of the resource changed. Grazing permits are now fewer, 
carry more restrictions, and periodically generate intense conflict between the entrepreneurial ranchers and 
hierarchical bureaucrats over increasing fees to true market costs. Resources with non-exclusive property rights 
are often governed by a group with egalitarian propensities toward that particular resource. For example, 
commons areas in apartment or condominium complexes are regulated by residents, municipal parks by officials 
only one step removed from a voting public. One might speculate that, at least in democratic societies which 
accord an almost religious significance to the idea of "one man, vote," resources that are governed by elected 
managers, or that are seen as the property of a discrete set of voters, will tend to be subject to non-exclusive 
property rights. However, considering the social biases of the resource regulators (institution makers) raises the 
dilemma created when a group behaves one way and argues another. Policy makers do not necessarily endorse 
policies that reflect their own cultural bias. They may, for example, be entrepreneurs who for political reasons 
endorse egalitarian policies. Also, any successful management policy must be congruent with the users' 
preferences. Otherwise, the users will seek to subvert the policy. 
 
It is in a discussion of the scale of the user pool that cultural theory will be most useful. While the scale of the 
user pool is not strictly synonymous with political jurisdiction, the two are intertwined. At one end of the scale 
are small, self-contained communities such as were once found in medieval Europe and are now virtually 
restricted to developing countries (although some see new commons emerging in such unlikely places as the 
inner cities where parking privileges are restricted to area residents). In these communities, the traditional 
commons system (Cox, 1985; Gonner, 1966, Hoskins and Stamp, 1965) has the most chance of success (Berkes, 
1981; Berkes and Pocock, 1981; Ruddle and Akimichi, 1984; Ruddle and Johannes, 1985). At the opposite end of 
this scale are the virtually unrestricted user pools comprised of users from many nations and ethnic groups. These 
user groups have little formalized political control, largely because the resources, e.g., high seas fisheries, they 
use are outside political jurisdiction. In this category, restraints and management restrictions of any kind are 
difficult to apply because of a lack of agreement among participants, a lack of political jurisdiction, and the 
extreme difficulty of consistent enforcement. 
 
Between these two extremes lie a wide variety of user pools, such as localized user pools that are part of a wider 
political community which impinges upon use of the resource. Fishing towns such as Gloucester, Massachusetts 
in the nineteenth century are an example of this level of user pool. Access here is rarely restricted because the 
user pool from any one community is small compared to the resource; the resource becomes endangered by the 
combination of many such user pools. Here restraints are often self-imposed (Berkes and Pocock, 1981; Pringle, 
1985). 
 
Another possible category is the regional user pool which is, once again, controlled by an external political 
community. Examples of this category include river basins, larger coastal areas such as the New England region 
of the American eastern seaboard (Dewar, 1983), or interstate regions such as the Chesapeake Bay area. 
 
A fifth category is the national user pool; this community of users has an internal political control in that the 
users are drawn from throughout the political jurisdiction exercising control. Visitors or national parks come from 
the entire nation and the regulations they face have been devised by a national process, unlike consumers of 
municipal water who are constrained by state and federal regulations as well as their own municipal ordinances. 
 
Quite clearly the discussion of the user pool can benefit from cultural theory. Just as all common property 
resources cannot be lumped into a single resource type, resource users and regulators are culturally variable. The 
cultural hypothesis is that  
 
individuals exert control over each other by institutionalizing the moral judgments justifying their 
interpersonal relationships so they can be acted upon and accounted for (Wildaysky, 1987, p. 8). 
 
This implies that individuals devise institutions not only to control behavior within their own social context but 
also to create political environments which inhibit the exercise of other social contexts. 
 
MANAGING COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
Some common property resources are managed successfully. Others are not. The task here is to test cultural 
theory against other modes of explanation. This would seem first to involve three concerns: how "successfully" is 
to be judged, how the management institutions are categorized, and how common property resources are 
categorized. The first question can be answered without much difficulty, although the response may certainly 
generate some controversy. 
 
Successful management of a renewable common property resource maintains a ecological sustainability while 
reducing the traditional user pool as little as possible.
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 This definition is open to a multitude of market-based 
criticisms. My basis here is that for most common property resources, a user pool already exists with expectations 
of access. Most schemes to limit access involve initial access rights for current users with incentives, 
disincentives, and entry regulations to manipulate the user pool size in the future. One could also argue that 
because of capital investment costs, the rational person will deplete the resource quickly, then move his 
investment to other enterprises. However, 
 
Much of human history stands in disproof of the argument that the structure of political institutions and 
their legitimacy can be explained by simple reference to rational self-interest. Surely that rational self-
interest of social class and of ethnic and religious groups is a powerful dynamic illuminating political 
movements and conflicts, and contributing significantly to historical outcomes. But patriotism, 
community loyalty, religious values, and simple habit and tradition obviously enter into the explanation of 
political structure and legitimacy (Almond, 1980, p. 30). 
 
It is necessary here to acknowledge that viewing economic rationality as an insufficient basis for decision making 
is a concomitant of other cultural biases. This definition of "successful" certainly reflects the author's bias, an 
influence which seems unavoidable. The problems this generates will be seen in the discussion of western 
ranchers below. 
 
The problem of categorizing institutions is not dealt with so easily. First, there is little agreement as to the 
meaning of the term "institutions" (Ostrom, 1986a). The field of possible definitions, if we exclude the insights of 
cultural theory, is dramatically limited, and this limitation "to either 'the market' or 'the state' means that the 
social-scientific 'medicine cabinet' contains only two nostrums" (Ostrom, 1986, p, 7). It seems probable that the 
form a management institution or organization takes will be dictated in part by the culture which constructs and 
legitimizes it. Therefore, rather than developing another typology to categorize common property resource 
management institutions, let us set aside this question and see how cultural theory applied to the resource user 
pool can inform our understanding of institutions. 
 
 
 
This brings us to the third concern: how can the common property resources best be categorized? And a corollary 
question is how to incorporate cultural theory into the categorization. 
 
First, if we intend to use cultural theory, we must find some way to operationalize grid and group. 
 
Group is a fairly easy concept to identify. We need to recognize that the distribution of individuals who share a 
strong sense of group will be bimodal (Thompson, 1985, pp. 380-381; but see also Gross and Rayner, 1985; 
Rayner, personal communication). That is, they will form two reasonably normal distributions, separated by their 
strength of prescriptions (see Fig. 4). Similarly, the low-group, strongly individualized continuum is bimodal 
although the separating factor here is the strength of the group boundaries (Thompson, 1985, p. 388). This means 
that relatively few individuals or groups of individuals exist at the borders of the categories. A scattergram of 
cultural distributions would place most points in the middle of each quadrant. Thus, for any single individual or 
group of individuals, we need only find a powerful identification along one of the two dimensions, and the 
second will be relatively easy to determine. For example, crab fishermen in the Chesapeake Bay, who have 
organized a watermen's association to fight state residency requirements, quite clearly have a strong sense of 
group identity and solidarity (Goldsborough, 1981; Warner, 1976). We have only to determine how strong their 
prescriptions are to place them within a cultural context. Role differentiation is slight; there is no clearly 
identified leader. We can place the leadership core of this group in the egalitarian block. 
 
It is much more difficult to measure grid. The most complete effort to date is found in Gross and Rayner's 
Measuring Culture (1985). They note in their discussion of Multiple Hierarchy (p. 67) that the number of rules is 
not necessarily an indication of strength of prescriptions. Groups may use multiple and contradictory rules to 
weaken prescriptions; the important consideration is the extent to which rules enhance hierarchy. Recent work by 
Elinor Ostrom and her associates is also helpful (Ostrom, 1986a, c). Ostrom's work is designed to apply to 
institutions, but there is no reason not to apply it to cultures as well. 
 
Ostrom outlines seven kinds of rules that structure action arenas which consist of the action situation (the 
environment) and the individual actors (Ostrom, 1986c, pp. 460-461). In our cultural theory terminology, these 
rules govern social relationships; they are the operational form of the culture. The seven types of rules are: (1) 
what positions participants may, must, or must not hold (position rules), (2) what characteristics participants may, 
must, or must not have to enter positions (boundary rules), (3) the authorized actions participants may, must, or 
must not take independently (authority rules), (4) the formula that participants may, must, or must not use for 
decision making when multiple persons must decide (aggregation rules), (5) the information that participants 
may, must, or must not reveal to others (information rules), (6) the state of the world that participants may, must, 
or must not affect (scope rules), and (7) the rewards or penalties which may, must, or must not be assigned to 
actions or outcomes (payoff rules) (Ostrom, 1986b, p. 23). One very interesting characteristic of this list is the 
"may, must, or must not" nature of each rule. This flexibility makes room for the opposing viewpoints in the three 
active cultural biases. For example, the authority rules could as easily prohibit assumption of leadership 
(egalitarians "must not" be leaders) as allow it (individualists "may" be leaders) or require it (hierarchs "must" 
seek leadership). To be consistent, some terminology should be changed. Boundary rules would become 
eligibility rules, authority rules become leadership rules, and aggregation rules become decision rules. By simply 
determining whether certain rules exist, the strength of prescriptions or grid can be measured comparatively. 
Take, for example, a group such as the cattle ranchers in the western states who rely heavily on Federal Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) grazing permits to subsidize their livestock operations through grazing on public 
lands. While there are organizations to which such people belong, there is no one group which draws a boundary 
around them, give them rights and protections, and applies levies and constraints (Douglas, 1982, p. 191). Being 
a weak group, they are either ineffectuals or entrepreneurs. How might we ask about their strength of 
prescriptions? 
 
1. Eligibility Rules. Do the ranchers set the conditions under which a person has access to BLM grazing 
rights? No, these rules are set by external forces (Department of Interior) although the ranchers certainly 
bring strong lobbying to bear. Ultimately, however, they are bound by BLM decisions made in Washington. 
Until the rangelands became obviously abused, and this abuse was brought to public attention, ranchers were 
content with BLM decisions, largely because the conditions for access were satisfactorily few. 
2. Leadership Rules. May ranchers decide, independent of each other, how they will manage their permits? 
Yes. The only control comes from the Federal Government and that control is very weak. Ranchers do not 
interfere with their neighbors' management techniques. 
3. Decision Rules. Are group decisions made by a pre-existing formula? No, the few group decisions that are 
made are on an an hoc basis with the most prominent (oldest and richest) taking temporary leadership. 
 
We could go through the entire rule list in this fashion, but it hardly seems necessary in order to confirm what we 
knew all along: western cattle ranchers have minimal prescriptions and are therefore entrepreneurial 
individualists. What does this tell us about their world views on nature, the likelihood that they will manage a 
common resource wisely, and the best way to ensure the resource has successful management? 
 
Enterpreneurs are ego-focused. Their idea of nature is Skill-Controlled Cornucopia and their myth is Nature 
Benign, neither of which will encourage resource conservation or preservation. They prefer to minimize 
leadership, they tend to exploit their environment, and the tragedy they are most likely to face is the tragedy of 
the commons. This is in fact what has happened on most of the public (common property) grazing lands of the 
west. Each rancher follows the economic rationality of squeezing as many cattle as possible onto his allotment. 
 
Cultural theory indicates that the ranchers are only behaving as their cultural bias prescribes. For range managers 
(probably hierarchs) or conservationists (probably egalitarians) to ask "what can be done" exposes their cultural 
biases as well. For argument's sake we have assumed that successful management (defined above) is an 
acceptable goal. To achieve successful management, one of two things could be done.
5 
First, managers and 
conservationists could try simple education and conversation; neither is likely to do much good in the absence of 
a strong challenge to existing biases. To change the entrepreneur requires the surprise mentioned by Thompson 
(1984): an accumulation of negative feedback that challenges existing biases. In fact, the deterioration of the 
public range almost past recovery forced some ranchers to realize that nature was not endlessly abundant. They 
did not assume the egalitarian position of an ephemeral, fragile nature. Instead, they developed new techniques 
and technology to structure the environment; they shifted from exploitation to control. 
 
The second option, to force change on the ranchers, is the imposition of external controls, i.e., regulation, by the 
hierarch. Cultural theory would predict several possible outcomes here. The first would be a concerted effort of 
resistance through organizing into strong lobbying groups. The ranchers have been able to do this but once the 
immediate threat is removed, their dislike of prescriptions and groups allows disintegration of the lobby. A 
second possibility is that the egalitarians (many environmental groups) could form a temporary alliance with the 
hierarchs (see Thompson, 1985, p. 393 for an elaboration of this process). The hierarchs, disliking the disorder of 
depleted ranges and the insult to their control mechanisms, did indeed accept the egalitarian political power and 
for a short while the specter of a non-subsidizing fee structure (equality of result for the egalitarians and 
imposition of status for the hierarchs) was a strong possibility. As one would expect, the surprise based change, 
small as it is, had endured, but once the hierarch-egalitarian coalition disbanded, the entrepreneurs who reacted 
under pressure reverted to their old, individualistic ways. Thompson (personal communication, see Footnote 5) 
argues that this solution failed not because it was inevitable but rather because it was incorrectly designed. 
 
Thus, one lesson we learn is that unsuccessful management institutions that are supported by the appropriate 
cultural context are unlikely to change unless the cultural context is changed. Common property resources being 
used or largely controlled by weak group-weak grid entrepreneurs will fall prey to the tragedy of the commons 
unless either the entrepreneurs can be converted to hierarchs or a sufficiently strong opposition can be mounted to 
maintain a balance of power and a constant state of tension or conflict.  
 
In a similar fashion, we could demonstrate that those common property resources that are managed successfully 
are controlled by users with either the egalitarian or hierarchical ideas of nature. 
 
This brief use of cultural theory explains why ranchers faced the tragedy of the commons on public grazing lands 
and why some remedies have succeeded while others failed. Although this may have been an easy example 
(chosen partly because most of the readers will be familiar with both the situation and the cultural biases 
involved), there is no canon of theory development that requires us to test only hard or obscure cases. The 
explanation offered is intuitively satisfying. 
 
The biggest difficulty with applying cultural theory to common property resource management is the paucity of 
good ethnographic data.
6
 Resource management information is usually focused on the resource itself and not on 
the users. What data on users are available often are economic (pounds of crabs landed per year, animals grazed 
per acre per month) and rarely are concerned with such non-technical parameters as group affiliation. Finally, as 
the user pool increases in size, the permutations of cultural biases also increase, and finding one management 
strategy for the whole is increasingly problematic. However, cultural theory is relatively new. Detailed 
ethnographic information would not be difficult to accumulate once the criteria for the model are developed. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina-Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27412. 
2. Thompson and several co-workers at the Institute for Management Research and Development at the 
University of Warwick have remedied these problems by adding Nature Capricious to Holling's myths 
and by putting Nature Resilient to one side as a meta-myth that has a different status from the primary 
four (see James, Tayler, and Thompson, 1987). 
3. Since developing my typology, I have read Ronald Oakerson's (1986) excellent article, "A Model for the 
Analysis of Common Property Problems." He bases his model on four components: technical and physical 
attributes, decision-making arrangements, patterns of interaction, and outcomes or consequences. His 
approach differs from mine in his emphasis on economics literature and theories of collective choice, 
while I have incorporated biological characteristics and political jurisdictions. As the reader will see, our 
outcomes are quite similar. 
4. Successful management of a non-renewable resource requires consideration of equity, duration of 
exploitation, alternative technologies, and even, upon occasion, intergenerational justice. In the essay, I 
have focused on renewable resources. 
5. Michael Thompson (personal communication) suggests a third alternative. He writes: "What would be 
rational would be for [the ranchers] to welcome an externally generated solution that would prevent the 
outcome and, by ensuring that the restrictions applied equally without fear or favor, enabled them to 
continue as individualists. This suggests a different interpretation of the tragedy: the hierarchists did not 
offer their controls in a form that was culturally congenial to the ranchers. . . . It is this sort of analysis of 
institutional re-design that is my version of how [cultural theory] should be applied." 
6. One of the reviewers of this paper noted that for western ranching, at least, a great deal of good 
information exists. A colleague and I are indeed working on a paper exploring the Sagebrush Rebellion, 
using the cultural theory approach. I did not mean to imply that no good data exist. Rather the problem is 
that the data are not readily available (one must hunt through journals, newspapers, interviews, etc.), and 
since they are "soft," i.e., not-technical, data, resource managers are reluctant to make policy decisions on 
that evidence. 
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